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Abstract
Fragmentation, echo chambers, and their amelioration in social
networks have been a growing concern in the academic and non-
academic world. This paper shows how, under the assumption of
homophily, echo chambers and fragmentation are system-immanent
phenomena of highly flexible social networks, even under ideal con-
ditions for heterogeneity. We achieve this by finding an analytical,
network-based solution to the Schelling model and by proving that
weak ties do not hinder the process. Furthermore, we derive the mini-
mal algorithmic bias needed for the mitigation of such fragmentation.
However, we show that algorithmic bias is incapable of stopping the
fragmentation process and the effect on reducing its convergence speed
is negligible.
Keywords: social networks, echo chambers, algorithmic bias, Schelling
model, mathematical modelling, homophily
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1 Introduction
Echo chambers or filter bubbles have been a concern since the early years
of the commercial internet, despite lacking a clear-cut definition. Sunstein
(2017) warned that too much personalisation may lead to ‘online segregation’,
where individuals would surround themselves with people of ostensibly sim-
ilar characteristics or ideologies. Van Alstyne and Brynjolfsson (2005) claim
that the Internet makes it easier to find like-minded people and thus facili-
tates the creation of fringe communities that have a common ideology. These
tendencies lead to the so-called Fragmentation Thesis (s. Bright, 2018) cap-
turing the emergence of increasingly politically-driven divisions in online dis-
cussion networks. Fragmentation of (online) social networks has often been
attributed to the sociological concept of homophily (Lazarsfeld and Merton,
1954; Mcpherson et al., 2001). Homophily states that individuals, which are
similar on some sociological, economic, genetic or other plane are more likely
to interact or form social ties. Homophily has a natural ally in Gratifica-
tion Theory, a concept from psychology (Rosengren, 1974). It describes the
selective behaviour of individuals seeking to gratify certain pre-formed pref-
erences in a high-choice environment, such as social media. Thus, social
media platforms require individuals to be highly selective in their consump-
tion of political content or engagement in political discussion. Given that
these preferences are naturally homophilic, individuals are likely to be drawn
to content and discussion partners aligned with their own beliefs, which in
turn is encouraged by the affordances of a social media platform (Cho, 2003;
Vaccari et al., 2016). Thus social media might exacerbate an underlying so-
ciological tendency of homogenous clusters within social networks.
Whilst clustering in online social networks is a well-established empirical
fact (e.g. Adamic and Glance, 2005; Newman, 2006; Conover et al., 2011;
Barbera´, 2015a), a similarly interesting question is whether they are some-
what inevitable (Sasahara et al., 2019) . The segregation of offline networks
takes longer given geographical and temporal constraints and is thus prone
to stochastic or social shocks upsetting the fragmentation process. However
online social networks are much freer in their dynamics. From these consid-
erations this paper derives its first research question:
RQ1: Is fragmentation in (online) social networks inevitable, given pres-
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ence of homophily and the high-pace dynamic of the structure of the network?
Echo chambers are clearly a worrying phenomenon, since they are bad for so-
cial cohesion and democratic, deliberative decision-making processes (Sunstein,
2017; Bright, 2018). Algorithmically biased recommender systems have often
been blamed for fostering these segregative tendencies. Thus, if part of the
problem is algorithmic so should be its remedy. Therefore this paper derives
its second research question:
RQ2: Can algorithmic bias counteract homophilic fragmentation of social
networks? If so, what is the minimal algorithmic bias needed for fragmenta-
tion not to occur?
This paper tries to answer these research questions by building and ana-
lytically solving a network representation of the Schelling model. The latter
originally models spatial and residential segregation based on homophilic
preferences of individuals (Schelling, 1971). Our model uses the benchmark
case of an ‘ideal liberal’ network, i.e. a network in which individuals have no
inherent biases in forming their connections (e.g. preferential attachment,
social, political or racial biases inherent to the network structure, algorith-
mic biases) or limitations with whom and with how many they will forge
a connection. This paper refers to this as the ‘ideal liberal’ case, since it
corresponds to the ideal state of a liberal society and indeed the self-image
of many social media platforms. Subsequently, the paper shows how even
in networks with ideal conditions for heterogeneity a limited amount of ho-
mophily is sufficient to cause complete fragmentation in the limit. The paper
supports this claim by proving that the result also obtains when including
weak ties. Weak ties are secondary connections between individuals, i.e. ”a
friend of a friend” and have often been cited as having powerful hidden in-
fluences on social networks with regards to access to resources, information
sharing, or network heterogeneity (Granovetter, 1973).
Lastly, the paper tries to derive the minimal algorithmic bias needed to
stop fragmentation in the network. This is done by rewiring edges between
similar nodes to dissimilar nodes to increase heterogeneity. However, no level
of rewiring bias can prevent the network from fragmenting and the influence
on reducing the fragmentation speed is negligible. This poses some serious
policy and ethical concerns for the accountability of administrators of social
media sites. Firstly, it posits the question that if social media administrators
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are able to bias the tie creation process in favour of increased network het-
erogeneity, then should they be allowed to, obliged, or even litigated to do
so. Secondly, if social media sites may be incapable of fostering sufficient het-
erogeneity to prevent unsustainable levels of polarisation, the question begs
whether they should be held accountable for political instability or social
unrest. These are pressing ethical questions, since values such as individual
freedom and privacy rights may conflict with wider political and social con-
cerns of political uncertainty or discord.
This paper is organised in the following sections: Section 2 presents a re-
view of related work, especially focussing on the Schelling model of segrega-
tion and the argument of weak ties posing a potential amelioration to the
problem of network segregation. Section 3 presents the Homophily Theo-
rem, which is a network operationalisation of the Schelling model. Section
4 presents the Weakness of Weak Ties Theorem, which acts as an extension
to this model. It shows how even when considering weak, i.e. secondary
ties, the fragmentation process is uninhibited. Section 5 derives the minimal
amount of algorithmic bias required for a network not to fragment. Section
6 briefly summarises the social science interpretations and implications of
these findings.
2 Literature Review
Echo chambers or filter bubbles seem to lack a coherent definition or opera-
tionalisation. One strand of studies defines echo chambers as highly-selective
news diets (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2011; Boxell et al., 2017; Dubois and Blank,
2018). Other studies have analysed echo chambers and selective exposure
based on media migration (Hollander, 2015) or measuring media diets based
on URL-click data against a random baseline (Nikolov et al., 2015a). Most
studies on echo chambers rest on community detection and network cluster-
ing algorithms. Many of them have shown how networks seem to cluster along
party lines or ideological beliefs on social media platforms (Adamic and Glance,
2005; Newman, 2006; Conover et al., 2011).
Many studies on echo chambers have tried to argue that echo chambers are
overstated by pointing to the existence of weak ties (Bakshy et al., 2012;
Barbera´, 2015b; Barbera´ et al., 2015; Barbera´, 2015a; Hollander, 2015). Weak
ties are supposed to counteract clustering movements by exposing users to
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opinions and information outside of their peer group. However, the proba-
bility of this being a decisive counteracting factor seems to be overstated if
merely relying on the existence of weak ties. Iyengar and Hahn (2009) show
that exposure to different views can actually entrench existing opinions even
more, and Yardi and Boyd (2010) claim that whilst exposure to opposing
views might be higher, meaningful engagement with them is low. Therefore,
exposure to differing opinions may not be a sufficient metric to determine
whether a society is polarised. Moreover, Marin (2012) shows that infor-
mation holders in social networks base their decisions to share or withhold
information on desire to help, reputational concerns, reluctance to appear
intrusive, or fear of awkwardness resulting from negative consequences. This
shows that when it comes to effective information sharing and information
reception, weak ties alone are insufficient. The more important notion seems
to be bandwidth. The latter captures the level of trust, reputation, or use-
fulness that a neighbouring node is associated with. Crudely speaking, a
distant relative may be outside one’s own echo chamber, but the effect of
them posting controversial news stories on one’s timeline is unlikely to affect
one’s opinion or the strength of the echo chamber effect. Crazy uncles rarely
cause political epiphanies.
The underlying social force of echo chambers is homophily (Lazarsfeld and Merton,
1954; Mcpherson et al., 2001). Homophily is a well-documented sociological
phenomenon (s. McPherson et al. for a comprehensive review) and has been
frequently observed on social media (Barbera´, 2015b; Barbera´ et al., 2015;
Barbera´, 2015a; Nikolov et al., 2015b; Tucker et al., 2018).
Homophily is also the underlying principle of a famous model of spatial seg-
regation, e.g. in housing. The renowned Schelling model (Schelling, 1971)
shows how even limited homophilous preferences lead to high levels of segre-
gation: Let there be a real line with dots of two different colours randomly
assorted. Let each dot have a preference for its neighbours to be of a similar
colour. Should one dot move from a heterogenous neighbourhood to a more
homogenous neighbourhood this trivial increases homogeneity in both neigh-
bourhoods. But also other dots, which may have less homophilic tendencies
are now proportionately surrounded by more dots of a different colour, thus
reinforcing their desire to move as well. It becomes clear, how the process
unravels and segregation becomes self-sustained, even if starting with very
mild homophilic preferences and perfectly heterogenous neighbourhoods.
Whilst, the original model was designed on a real line with nodes moving
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from one position to another in a one-dimensional space and the prefer-
ences driving segregation are hotly debated (Clark and Fossett, 2008), there
has been a plethora of studies trying to generalise this model to more com-
plex domains since. Vinkovic and Kirman (2006) adapt the model to cluster
formation in physical systems, whilst Stauffer and Solomon (2007) compare
residential separation to phase separation in physics. Some studies have ex-
tended the model to two- or multidimensional spaces in simulations and ana-
lytic proofs (Dall’Asta et al., 2008; Immorlica et al., 2015; Barmpalias et al.,
2016, 2018). Studies more rooted in the model’s home discipline of economics
have included factors such as housing markets (Zhang, 2004) or used it in
a game-theoretic study of collective action (Iwanaga and Namatame, 2013).
Pancs et al. (2007) show how even if all actors have a strict preference for
integration, the segregation result still holds. The majority of studies intro-
duce a tolerance parameter as a perturbation to the process and find that
the segregation process can be stopped for specific values of such parameters
(Gauvin et al., 2009; Gracia-La´zaro et al., 2011; Hazan and Randon-Furling,
2013; Immorlica et al., 2015). Immorlica et al. (2015) find an analytic re-
sult for an unperturbed one-dimensional Schelling model, starting from a
random configuration, but finding a high probability of segregation. Some
models have translated the model into network environments (Banos, 2012).
One study finds a network-based analytical solution to the Schelling model
(Henry et al., 2011). Nodes rewire their edges stochastically based on dif-
ferent levels of aversion. The termination of an edge is based on attribute
distance between two actors. The model finds a conversion to a distribution
and derives a measure of attribute distance, measuring the degree of segrega-
tion. The intuitive result of the model is that segregation will always emerge
outside of additional endogenous or exogenous drivers of network structure.
Translating the Schelling model from a real line to a network conjures some
similarities and overlaps with the Axelrod model (Axelrod, 1997). The latter
is a model of social influence and similarly to Schelling was based on moving
around black and white dots on a checker board. Under the assumption that
the more neighbours interact the more similar they become he shows how
local convergence can lead to global polarisation. With probability equal to
their cultural similarity a randomly chosen site on the lattice will adopt one
of the cultural features of a randomly chosen neighbours. Axelrod shows
how a) the number of stable regions increases with number of possible traits
and decreases with range of interaction, and b) the number of stable regions
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decreases with more cultural features and with large territories.
The model has sparked a number of extension and combinations with the
Schelling model. Guerra et al. (2010) translate the model from a lattice to
a scale-free network with dynamic links and show that feature consensus is
reached faster than global consensus. Lanchier and Scarlatos (2013) include
homophily into Axelrod’s model of social influence. That is, an interaction
between two nodes persists until either feature consensus is reached or one
of the nodes terminates the tie and moves somewhere else. Thus, the model
combines Schelling’s idea of segregative homophily with Axelrod’s social in-
fluence. The paper proves in a two-state model with arbitrary number of
features that when the number of features exceeds the number of states per
features, the Axelrod model leads to clusters. Gracia-La´zaro et al. (2011)
present another version of the Axelrod-Schelling model showing that a pro-
cess of natural selection of advantageous traits seem to emerge. Rodr´ıguez and Moreno
(2010) include the mass media as an actor into the model as a node with more
heavily weighted edges and a larger neighbourhood and thus more influence.
They show in a numerical simulation that the monocultural state is attained
with stronger dependency on mass media strength and that network size
seems to drive system into a polarised society where all possible cultural
configurations are present.
A recent paper by Sasahara et al. (2019) builds another hybrid Axelrod-
Schelling model. They show how a network fragments and polarises natu-
rally from a non-polarised starting point and validate their model with sim-
ulations on Twitter data. Whilst using Schelling homophily for rewiring,
the driving mechanism for them is bounded social influence. Similarly,
Chitra and Musco (2019) build a hybrid model of social influence and ho-
mophily using the Friedkin-Johnson model (Friedkin and Johnsen, 1999).
They include a network administrator into their model, who seeks to minimise
disagreement between users thus fostering filter bubbles. In fact, changing
total edge weights by 40 percent increases polarisation 40 fold. They fur-
thermore show that for a network generated by a Stochastic Block Model
(SBM) that there may be low polarisation and fragile consensus, which how-
ever is very easily perturbed leading to mass polarisation. Yet, they also find
that if the network administrator seeks to mitigate filter bubbles it only in-
creases disagreement by five percent. A related paper comes from Sˆırbu et al.
(2019). The paper adapts the opinion dynamics model of bounded confidence
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by account for algorithmic bias. Discussion partners are paired at random
and converge in their opinion, if their original opinion difference is suffi-
ciently small. In the converse case, they keep their opinion as it was before.
Sˆırbu et al. (2019) modify this model by making the probability of two in-
dividuals interacting proportional to their opinion difference. That is, the
smaller the opinion differential the more likely the interaction between two
individuals. They show in a simulation that this leads to higher opinion
fragmentation, increased polarisation of opinions, as well as a stark decrease
in the rate of opinion convergence.
3 The Homophily Theorem
3.1 Model Intuition
A space is populated by individuals (nodes) of two types, e.g. red and green.
The nodes are unconnected at the start of the model. In the 0th timestep
they each form one connection to one other node with equal chance for a
similar or dissimilar connection. The formation of these edges is unbiased,
i.e. it is equally probable that a green node connects to another green node or
a red node. From this timestep onwards, the edge formation is preferential.
That is, at each timestep nodes form connections with other nodes, with a
slight preference to connect to a node of similar colour. The process is as
follows: e.g. if a green node has a lot of connections to red nodes there
is a high probability that the next connection it forms is to another green
node. The more connections to dissimilar nodes, the higher the probability
of forming further connections with similar nodes. This is an application
of a Schelling model and follows a simple intuition: If a node prefers to be
amongst similar nodes, but is currently surrounded by dissimilar nodes, it
will have a stronger preference for the next connection to be to a node of
a similar kind. Note that for the model it is irrelevant whether these are
strong or weak homophilic preferences. Additionally, nodes lose connections
at each timestep with a certain probability. The longer a connection has
persisted, the less likely a node is to lose this connection. I.e. the older the
friendship, the more likely it is to persist. Letting this mechanism run its
course, the network becomes entirely clustered into a green and red cluster in
the limit. That is, the probability of forming a connection with a dissimilar
node converges to zero.
8
3.2 Mathematical Formulation
Let there be a network with an infinite number of nodes n, but no edges
before time t = 0. At t = 0 let each node form an edge with another node
with no preferential bias with probability p0 ∼ Bernoulli(0.5, 0.5). Thus,
there are n(n−1)
2
pairs of connected nodes. From t = 1 at each time step, each
node creates a new connection at random:
Let pt ∈ [0, 1] be the probability of one node making a connection to a
node of the same type.
Let qt ∈ [0, 1] be the probability of a node making a connection to node
of a different type.
Trivially pt = 1− qt.
Let Et ∈ Z
+ be the total number of edges with Et = Es,t + Ed,t , where
Es,t is the number of edges between similar nodes and Ed,t the number of
edges between different nodes. Let E[Ed,i,t] be the expected number of edges
from node i to nodes of a different type to i.
E[Ed,i,t] = qi,t + kdEd,i,t−1, where kd is the proportion of nodes of a different
type from the previous period, that are still attached to node i, i.e. the
proportion of different connections kept. This process can be conveniently
described by a hazard function, i.e. a decay function. The latter captures
that the older a connection gets, the less likely it is to be severed, since older
connections tend to be socially stronger.
kd = 1− λ
−γdγdt
γd−1, where λ ≥ 1 is a scale parameter, and γd < 1
This implies:
E[Ed,i,t] = qi,t+ (1− λ
−γdγdt
γd−1) Ed,i,t−1
Let Es,i,t behave symmetrically , with γd < γs:
E[Es,i,t] = pi,t + ksEs,i,t−1 = pi,t + (1− λ
−γsγst
γs−1) Es,i,t−1
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Iterating this equation backwards yields
E[Ed,i,t] = qi,t +
t∑
j=0
kd,t−jqi,t−j−1
with E0 =
n(n−1)
2
and thus Ed,0 =
n(n−1)
4
. N.B. that the process for the ex-
pected number of similar edges looks the same, albeit with kd < ks.
For all t > 0 let pt=f(
Ed,t−1
Et−1
), where f ′ > 0 and f ′′ < 0 and f(1) = 1.
That is, the probability increases concavely in the number of edges formed
to dissimilar nodes with a maximum reached at 1. The latter implies that
individuals have no saturation point for homophily, something that can also
be found in the Schelling model. Using the mean-field approximation we can
assume pt=f(
Ed,t−1
Et−1
).
Theorem 1 For any concave strictly monotonically increasing function
f : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], pt converges to 1 and thus E[Ed,t] converges to zero.
3.3 Proof
Consider the following system of equations:
pi,t = 1− qi,t = f(
Ed,i,t−1
Et−1
) (1)
E[Ed,i,t] = qi,t +
t∑
j=0
kd,t−jqi,t−j−1 (2)
where f ′ > 0 and f ′′ < 0, λ ≥ 1, and γd < 1.
The derivative of the probability of making similar connections with respect
to the probability of making dissimilar connections is given by
∂pi,t
∂qi,t−1
= f ′(
Ed,i,t−1
Et−1
)t−1 > 0 (3)
This implies that as t → ∞,
∂pi,t
∂qi,t
→ 0. And thus for all strictly monotoni-
cally increasing concave functions f on [0, 1], pi,t → 1, implying qi,t → 0 and
E[Ed,i,t]→ 0.
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The proof above shows how social networks of infinite size with limited
homophily will gravitate towards complete fragmentation, even under ideal
conditions for heterogeneity given a presence of limited homophily. Given no
exact functional form other than an operationalisation of Schelling homophily
was imposed on pi,t, the model can incorporate other operationalisations of
homophily, e.g. attribute vectors. It furthermore proves the Schelling result
of segregation in a network setting.
4 The Weakness of Weak Ties Theorem
This theorem will act as an extension to the Homophily Theorem. It will add
a form of resistance to the fragmentation based on weak ties of one group to
another. Weak ties have been extensively discussed in the literature, since
Granovetter’s seminal paper on how weak ties are often decisive in resource
and information extraction (Granovetter and Soongt, 2016). In social me-
dia analyses weak ties have often been cited as counteracting mechanisms
to the existence of echo chambers (Barbera´ et al., 2015; Barbera´, 2015a,b;
Hollander, 2015; Bakshy et al., 2015)). The Weakness of Weak Ties The-
orem will attempt to show that the result of the Homophily Theorem still
holds even with the existence of weak ties.
4.1 Mathematical Formulation
At every time step, in addition to the new random connection (primary)
each node connects to a neighbor of its neighbors who is dissimilar to itself
(secondary). Let node i be attached to a similar node k with probability pi.
Node k will be connected to a dissimilar node with probability qk = 1 − pk.
Thus, the expected number of dissimilar ties, primary and secondary (i.e.
weak), for node i are given by the following expression
E[Ed,i,t] = qi,t + piqk + qipk + kdEd,i,t−1
After substituting the expression for Ed,k,t, iterating the equation backwards:
E[Ed,i,t] = qi,t+piqk+qipk+
t∑
j=0
kd,t−j(qi,t−1−j+pi,t−j−1qk,t−j−1+qi,t−j−1pk,t−j−1)
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Theorem 2 For any concave monotonically increasing function
f : [0, 1] → [0, 1], pt converges to 1 and thus E[Ed,t] converges to zero, even
in the presence of secondary ties.
4.2 Proof
The derivative in equation (3) has now changed to:
∂pi,t
∂qi,t−1
= f ′(
E[Ed,t−1
Et−1
)
1 + pk,t−1
t
= f ′(
E[Ed,t−1
Et−1
)
1 + (1− qk,t−1)
t
> 0 (4)
Given that pk,t is bounded in [0,1] for all t, this means that the derivative
converges to zero. Note that the convergence rate is being slowed down com-
pared to the result of the Homophily Theorem, but that this deceleration
quickly declines over time as t increases and by symmetry qk,t−1 decreases.
Thus, for all strictly monotonically increasing functions f on [0,1], pi,t → 1,
implying qi,t → 0 and E[Ed,i,t]→ 0, even in the presence of weak ties.
Thus, the Homophily Theorem even persists in the presence of secondary,
or weak ties. Note that the convergence time inconsiderably, but technically
increases for the likelihood of forming secondary ties. Yet, the increase in
convergence time is practically negligible. This indicates a robustness of the
Homophily Theorem and acts as a warning that weak ties may not be enough
to hedge against echo chambers.
5 Algorithmic Bias
5.1 Mathematical Model
Now we investigate the possibilities for stopping the fragmentation by finding
the minimal algorithmic bias that produces a non-zero value for the expected
number of different ties E[Ed,i,t]. This will be done in form of a rewiring
bias. The rewiring bias simply states that a certain proportion of existing
similar connections will be changed to dissimilar connections through an
algorithmic mechanism, here given by φi,t, thus increasing the heterogeneity
in the network. The intuition behind this can be described as individuals
being shown more content contrary to their views than they normally would
be exposed to given their network. I.e. a red node with a majority of red
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connections will see more ’green’ content than they normally would. This is
operationalized as follows:
E[Ed,i,t] = qi,t +
t∑
j=0
kd,t−jqi,t−1−j
+
t∑
j=0
kb,t−j
t∑
l=1
(φi,t−l − ks,t−l)(t− l − 1− qi,t−l−1)
+(φi,t − ks,t)(t− 1− qi,t−1)
(5)
, with kb < kd < ks. Note, that the result remains unchanged for homoge-
nous k across all types of connections and the distinction between biased,
dissimilar, and similar connection is done here for potential extensions of
the model and rigour. Another assumption for the rewiring bias is that the
longer a connection has persisted, the more difficult it becomes to rewire it.
If I have been a content consumer of BBC News the likelihood of accepting
an imposed change to Fox News is rather low and vice versa.
Consider the equation above with all variables at their steady state value.
N.B. that k in all cases converges to one.
E[Ed,i,t∗ ] = q
∗ + t∗q∗ + t∗(t∗ − 1)(φ∗ − 1)(t∗ − 2− q∗) + (φ∗ − 1)(t∗ − 1− q∗)
Since φ is bounded between zero and one, the optimal and in this case min-
imal level of bias is the boundary solution φ∗ = 1. This implies that every
similar connection is changed to a dissimilar connection. Consequently
E[Ed,i,t∗ ] = (1 + t
∗)q∗
And
E[Ed,i,t∗ ]
E[Es,i,t∗ ]
=
q∗
p∗
For the probability of making similar connections in the steady-state this
implies:
p∗ = f(
E[Ed,i,t∗−1]
t∗
) (6)
, which in the limit converges to
p∗ = f(1), for qt∗−1 > 0
13
The latter implies p∗ = 1 and therefore q∗ = 0 and E[Ed,i,t∗ ] = 0. Thus, for
any φ < 1, E[Ed,i,t∗ ] diverges and in fact becomes negative, whilst for φ = 0,
E[Ed,i,t∗ ] converges to zero. φ > 1 implies that there are similar connections
being rewired to dissimilar ones than actually exist, which is a contradic-
tion. Therefore, no rewiring bias can stop fragmentation in the limit. The
homophilic powers are simply too strong to prevent fragmentation even with
severe intervention, in this case rewiring all dissimilar nodes of an individual
to similar ones.
Furthermore, consider the influence of the algorithmic bias on the speed
of convergence. Equation (3) changes under algorithmic bias to
∂pi,t
∂qi,t−1
= f ′
1− (φi,t − ks,t)
t− 1
(7)
Note that as t→∞, ks,t → 1 and therefore the derivative converges to
∂pi,t
∂qi,t−1
= f ′
φi,t
t− 1
Similar to the Weakness of Weak Ties Theorem the process can be slowed
down using the bias φ. However, the necessary bias to prevent pi,t from
approaching one increases in t and therefore necessarily diverges, even if a
bias bigger than one would be conceptually possible.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
The Homophily Theorem is a form of a stylised Impossibility Theorem. That
means that even in ideal, stylised conditions heterogeneity in social networks
with any degree of homophily is impossible. The type of homophily or oper-
ationalisation is irrelevant since the function pt is as general a formulation of
homophily as it could possibly be. Whilst the assumption and operationali-
sation seem abstract and unrealistic at first, it is worth noting that the model
is thus capable of a number of different interpretations. Edges can be inter-
preted as friendship ties, or (more realistically) as connections in a discussion
or sharing network. Thus, the severance of ties can simply mean two users
stopping to talk to each other rather than the more drastic social action of
unfriending. Furthermore, a severance of ties can also represent that the tie
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simply has become irrelevant. Whilst it may exist pro forma in form of a
digital connection, the lack of interaction renders it meaningless. Lastly, the
Weibull process can alternatively be thought of as the strength of a tie di-
minishing rather than the probability of it vanishing. TheWeakness of Weak
Ties Theorem makes the results of the Homophily Theorem more robust. It
shows that even weak ties do not only not hedge against fragmentation, but
do not even slow down the process non-negligibly. It is however important to
mention that the model omits certain social factors which may drive network
unification, such as a common goal, the rule of law, or cultural similarities.
One such example can be found in Torok et al. (2013), where the collabora-
tive project of a Wikipedia article increases consensus in a network over time.
Notwithstanding, it can be shown that homophily massively increases in
scale and scope in social networks with high flexibility of node attachment
and detachment, such as online social networks. It is this flexibility generated
by a site’s affordances that facilitates users to gratify their desires, such as
homophily quickly and almost costlessly. Therefore, fragmentation becomes
a natural point of gravitation for these networks. Whilst complete fragmenta-
tion is obviously unrealistic, it is important to see that it is a natural tendency
for these types of networks. It is worth noting that the main assumption of
this model is obviously that fragmentation is driven by homophily and that
it ignores social influence. The question which of the two prevails more in
e.g. opinion networks on social media has not been empirically answered
yet. Should opinions be sufficiently robust on social media and confirmation
biases sufficiently strong, it seems more realistic that homophily is the driv-
ing force of tie generation and attrition in opinion networks. Furthermore,
Iyengar and Hahn (2009) show that exposure to different views can actually
entrench existing opinions even more, i.e. social influence may also worsen
rather than ameliorating the problem.
The introduction of algorithmic bias into the model shows that a network
administrator may have no substantial tools to alleviate this. Opposite to
the main idea of Chitra and Musco (2019) in this model the network ad-
ministrator has no incentive to minimise disagreement and seeks to stop
fragmentation. The model shows that in order to do so, the administrator
has to especially counteract the severance of ties by rewiring. This could for
instance mean that old connections, which have become irrelevant are now
sought to be reinvigorated, e.g. by recommender systems pushing them back
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to the top of the feed. However, Sasahara et al. (2019) point out that recom-
mending things that will be ignored is not a good strategy. They propose that
preventing triadic closure would be a even more neutral interference. Yet,
they also agree that complete severing of ties should be discouraged (e.g. by
the inclusion of affordances such as snoozing). The most concerning result
is that even without making any assumptions about the functional form of
algorithmic rewiring bias and rewiring every similar connection, the network
administrator is incapable of preventing the network to fragment in the limit.
Whilst in the early stages of tie generation the use of algorithmic bias might
slow down the fragmentation process, even this very quickly becomes im-
possible over time. This furthermore suggests that complete fragmentation
could only be fought by additive bias, which is very invasive and might also
not be accepted by users. Moreover, this poses big ethical and regulatory
questions on whether and how network administrators can or should inter-
fere. It furthermore may indicate that the social forces of fragmentation in
such highly flexible networks can only be tentatively mitigated by network-
based or algorithmic mechanisms.
This paper suggests how echo chambers are seemingly inevitable in social
networks with high flexibility of node attachment and detachment. Even
in ideal conditions for heterogeneity (such as no network inherent biases for
tie creation or algorithmic bias) a limited amount of homophily is sufficient
to cause the network to fragment in the limit. Furthermore, this paper has
shown how finding an optimal amount of algorithmic bias may be included
to ameliorate the problem. However, the result shows that even the highest
possible use of bias is insufficient to prevent network fragmentation in the
limit. Whilst it may slow down the process in very early stages of the network
dynamics it quickly becomes an insurmountable problem. Thus, there are
major regulatory and ethical questions concerning the role of network admin-
istrators. Firstly, if network-based mechanisms such as biased recommender
system can barely mitigate the problem, what is the responsibility of network
administrators and social media sites (especially now that Pandora’s box has
been opened)? Secondly, how much should network administrators intervene
in this process and how much does such intervention warrant regulation?
On a technical level the paper produces a straightforward translation of
the Schelling model into a network-based model. Furthermore, whilst the
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Schelling model has been shown as robust in simulations it hitherto has had
only one analytical solution (however not in network form). This is a con-
siderable methodological contribution, since as Brandt et al. (2012) point
out that the Schelling model is ”surprisingly difficult to analytically prove
or even rigorously define the segregation phenomenon observed qualitatively
in simulations. Another contribution is the result that weak ties do not
ameliorate the fragmentation process. Even stronger, weak ties do not even
substantially slow down fragmentation. This is a warning call, since there is
a prevalent view in the literature that weak ties hedge against the building
of echo chambers (Bakshy et al., 2012; Barbera´, 2015b; Barbera´ et al., 2015;
Barbera´, 2015a; Hollander, 2015).
Future work could be conducted in testing the fundamental assumption of
the model, namely homophily in opinion networks. That is, are dynamics in
opinion networks on social media mainly driven by homophily, due to psycho-
logical phenomena like confirmation bias, or are they sufficiently malleable
by neighbouring nodes. The model could be extended to incorporate such
social influences. Another extension could be proving that the model holds
in arbitrary dimensions of or different operationalisations of homophily. Fi-
nally, the behaviour of the model in finite networks and under additive bias
could be explored.
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